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1Introduction
Psychoanalytic Hostility to Politics
Th e Politics of a Nonpolitical Th eory
Psychoanalysis begins with individual subjects and their suff ering. By 
allowing subjects to speak freely in the analytic session and by off ering an 
interpretative intervention in this speech, psychoanalysis aims to reduce 
the impairment that their psychic disorder creates in their lives. In contrast 
to Marxism, which also att empts to ameliorate human suff ering, psycho-
analysis has no explicit political program designed to lessen the misery that 
Freud and his descendants fi nd in their patients. Th ere is no revolt of the 
patients that would correspond to the revolt of the proletariat. When Freud 
makes political pronouncements, they tend to be negative ones, expressing 
his skepticism about plans for social bett erment. But it is my contention 
that a viable political project does inhere within psychoanalytic theory 
and that this project provides an avenue for emancipatory politics aft er the 
end of Marxism in the twentieth century. Th ere are points at which this 
psychoanalytic politics remains proximate to Marxism, but it represents a 
genuine alternative that has the virtue of explaining the latt er’s failures. Th e 
task of this book will be to lay out the contours of this political project, one 
that has never been fully developed despite numerous att empts at bringing 
psychoanalytic thinking to bear on politics.
 Unlike most previous formulations of a psychoanalytic politics, what 
follows will take as its point of departure not the early Freud of the sexual 
drive but the later Freud of the death drive (and its development in the 
thought of Jacques Lacan and his followers). I will conspicuously ignore 
all psychoanalytic thinking that deviates from Freud and from his specifi c 
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rendering of the death drive. Th is means that psychoanalytic luminaries 
such as Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott , Wilfred 
Bion, and even Freud’s own daughter Anna Freud will have no role to play 
in this account of the psychoanalytic political project.
 Th e death drive has historically acted as a stumbling block for psycho-
analytic politics because it involves our self-sabotage. It leads us to work 
unconsciously against social bett erment. Th is is why, aft er its discovery in 
1920, Freud becomes so much more pessimistic as a thinker. But just as the 
death drive leads to self-sabotage, it also acts as the source of our enjoyment, 
and by shift ing the terrain of emancipatory politics to that of enjoyment, 
psychoanalysis off ers what Marxism’s political program could not. Th e 
politics of psychoanalysis aft er Marxism is an emancipatory project based 
on the self-sacrifi cing enjoyment located in the death drive. Marxism is 
able to theorize sacrifi ce as necessary for future pleasure, but it is unable 
to conceive sacrifi ce as an end in itself, as a source of enjoyment.1 Th is 
represents its fundamental limitation.
 Th e eff orts to marry psychoanalysis and a political program since Freud’s 
discovery of the unconscious have come from both sides of the aisle. Marx-
ist thinkers such as Th eodor Adorno and Louis Althusser have turned to 
psychoanalysis in order to supplement Marxism with a mode of thought 
that would address the complexities of subjectivity, while psychoanalytic 
thinkers such as Erich Fromm and Wilhelm Reich have turned to Marxism 
as a way of giving a sociohistorical importance to their understanding of 
the suff ering that they discovered in psychoanalytic practice. Today this 
intersection animates the thought of many of the most compelling voices 
in contemporary political thought: Alain Badiou, Étienne Balibar, Ernesto 
Laclau, Chantal Mouff e, Jacques Rancière, and Slavoj Žižek, to name just 
a few.
 But the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and politics has 
never freed itself of the fundamental divergence that animates it. Something 
about psychoanalytic thought inherently resists appropriation by a program 
aimed at the common good. Rather than helping with such a program, 
it almost inevitably testifi es to the reasons for its failure. Th e att empt to 
give political relevance to the insights of psychoanalysis seems a hopeless 
one, and yet this is precisely the aim of this book. Without minimizing the 
psychoanalytic critique of progress and the common good, it lays out the 
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contours of a political theory and practice derived from psychoanalytic 
thought. In doing so, it challenges the very history of psychoanalysis itself.
 While Freud expresses sympathy with the Russian Revolution and con-
tends that it seemed “like the message of a bett er future,” he continually 
emphasizes the intractable barriers that any project of emancipatory politics 
would encounter.2 About the Soviet Union in particular, he speculatively 
grasps the incipient horrors of Stalinism at a time when no one in the West 
had any direct knowledge of them (and the worst had yet to occur). In 
Civilization and Its Discontents he notes, “One only wonders, with concern, 
what the Soviets will do aft er they’ve wiped out their bourgeois.”3 Th is is a 
psychoanalytic insight into the nature of the emancipatory political proj-
ect that pursues the good society. For Freud, the Soviet att empt to create 
a bett er future not only chases an impossible goal, but it also exacerbates 
existing human suff ering. It is not simply Freud’s personal judgment or 
prejudice that renders this verdict and installs an incompatibility between 
psychoanalytic thought and progressive political programs; this incompat-
ibility inheres within the very psychoanalytic approach to the world.
 On the face of it, this claim appears counterintuitive: one can imagine, 
for instance, a psychoanalytic understanding of the nature of desire aiding 
political theorists in their att empts to free desire from ideology, which is 
the recurring diffi  culty of left ist politics. Th ere are even historical examples 
of this theoretical assistance at work. Louis Althusser develops his theory 
of ideological interpellation through his acquaintance with Jacques Lacan’s 
conception of the subject’s entrance into language, and Juliet Mitchell elabo-
rates her critique of the structural eff ects of patriarchy through her experi-
ence with Freudian conceptions of masculinity and femininity. In each 
case, psychoanalysis allows the theorist to understand how a prevailing 
social structure operates, and this provides a foundation for imagining a 
way to challenge this structure. As Mitchell claims, “Psychoanalysis is not 
a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of one. If we are 
interested in understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we 
cannot aff ord to neglect it.”4 Precisely because she sees psychoanalysis as a 
useful tool for political struggle, Mitchell here dismisses feminism’s long-
standing quarrel with psychoanalysis for its complicity with patriarchy.5
 Underlying a position like Mitchell’s (which almost all political theorists 
who turn to psychoanalysis embrace) is the idea that the political usefulness 
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of psychoanalysis stems, ironically, from its lack of a political commitment. 
Th at is to say, psychoanalysis aims to discover the unconscious truth of the 
subject and the society in which the subject exists, not to change this truth. 
It is thus at the most basic level a descriptive rather than a prescriptive art. 
Even the psychoanalytic cure itself does not portend radical change for 
the subject who accomplishes it. Th is subject simply recognizes, in Jacques 
Lacan’s words, “I am that.” Th e cure is more a recognition of who one is 
rather than a transformation of one’s subjectivity. Th ough psychoanalysis 
does view this recognition as the most radical kind of revolution, the revolu-
tion changes how the subject relates to its activity, not the activity itself. In 
this sense, psychoanalysis has no political axe to grind, which allows it to 
devote its energies to the project of interpretation and understanding. Th e 
understanding it produces can then form the basis for the diff erent sorts of 
left ist political contestation that may appropriate it.
 Th e problem with this appropriation is the point at which it arrests the 
descriptive process of psychoanalytic interpretation. Psychoanalysis does not 
merely describe the structure of one culture or socioeconomic formation 
(such as patriarchy or capitalism); it instead insists on a fundamental validity 
across cultural and socioeconomic boundaries. It also insists on this validity 
across diff erent historical epochs. It is, in short, a universal theory concern-
ing the relationship between the individual subject and society.6 Of course, 
Freud discovered psychoanalysis in a particular historical situation that 
shaped how he presented his insights and even the ideas he could formulate. 
But one can separate the particular elements (like the Oedipus complex or 
the labeling of homosexuality as a perversion) from the universal ones (like 
the antagonistic nature of society or the fact of castration as the requirement 
for entrance into society). Th e challenge for the psychoanalytic theorist is 
discovering the universality in Freud’s discoveries, but it is this universality 
that presents an obstacle for any political project. If the antagonism between 
the subject and the social order is irreducible, then the stumbling block is 
not just capitalism or patriarchy but human society itself.
 Th e insights of psychoanalysis, if valid at all, apply not simply to the 
past and the present but also to whatever future society we might envision 
or even realize. Th ough Freud developed the insights of psychoanalysis 
in a particular historical situation, this situation enabled him to discover 
universal structures of subjectivity and of the social order, even if his way 
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of conceptualizing these structures initially refl ected the constraints of his 
historical situation. Th e insights apply not only to contemporary patriarchal 
society but also, pace Juliet Mitchell, to the future society that frees itself 
from patriarchy. Th is is not to say that we will always have the same forms 
of neurosis and psychosis that we have now but that we will not surmount 
the fundamental antagonism between the social order and the individual 
subject that produces these specifi c disorders. As a result, for psychoanalysis 
the good society becomes an unatt ainable fi ction.
You’re No Good
Th e great challenge that psychoanalysis poses for emancipatory politics — and 
for politics as such — is its absolute rejection of the good or the good society. 
In the opening of the Politics, Aristotle describes the good as the basic aim 
of political activity, and this aim has remained constant in the intervening 
2,500 years.7 Aristotle never att empts to prove this constitutive remark in his 
treatise but simply takes it as an unassailable postulate of political thinking. 
For subsequent political thinkers, the question does not concern Aristotle’s 
claim about the good but in what the good consists. Th ere is unanimity 
about the political pursuit of the good not just among political theorists 
but among almost everyone who thinks about politics at all.
 From the perspective of psychoanalysis, however, there is no good at 
all. Th e good society is unatt ainable not just as a result of the competing 
desires of the individuals within the society. Th e theory that aligns social 
confl ict with the coexistence of competing individual desires fails to go far 
enough in envisioning the antagonistic nature of the social order. No matt er 
how divergent individual desires are, one could always imagine reconciling 
them with each other through some sort of compromise. A thinker such as 
John Rawls can imagine a just society despite positing a society divided by 
innumerable competing desires on the level of the individual. Justice here 
would consist in the idea of fairness — using one’s imagination to envision 
society through what Rawls labels a “veil of ignorance” that allows one to 
make decisions about justice without taking into account one’s individual 
interests or desires or social position.8 Th is would facilitate a good society in 
which any inequality would be socially justifi ed, and it would thus reconcile 
competing individual desires with each other.
Buy the Book
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 But the barrier to the good society runs deeper than this. It derives from 
the very idea of the good, which Freud sees as fundamentally at odds with 
itself. Th e good itself, not our failures to achieve it, is the problem. Th is is 
the fundamental political insight that psychoanalysis brings to the table. It is 
at once the challenge that it poses to emancipatory politics and the basis for 
its implicit project for emancipation. As we get closer to the ideal of a good 
society, we simultaneously approach the emptiness concealed within the 
ideal. Th e notion of the good does not emerge simply from moral reason-
ing and speculation about the proper arrangement of society. We develop 
this notion only through the experience of its prohibition. Th at is to say, 
the prohibition of the good doesn’t form an obstacle to a preexisting ideal 
but constitutes the ideal as such.
 Th e good has no existence outside of the barriers that we erect around 
realizing it. As Jacques Lacan points out in one of his most important political 
statements, “Th e step taken by Freud at the level of the pleasure principle 
is to show us that there is no Sovereign Good — that the Sovereign Good, 
which is das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a for-
bidden good, and that there is no other good. Such is the foundation of the 
moral law as turned on its head by Freud.”9 Th e foundational link between 
the good and prohibition renders its pursuit completely contradictory. 
Every step toward the good occasions a corresponding step away from it. 
Th e closer we come, the more we undermine the social stability that we 
hoped to achieve. Th is occurs not just among the many utopian socialist 
projects that have failed but across all types of social structures.
 For psychoanalysis, the good is not just an unrealizable ideal but a decep-
tion incapable of orienting a coherent and sustainable politics. Th is critique 
threatens to undermine the very idea of a political project because political 
theorists write in order to help bring about change, which means moving 
society in the direction of the good (even if they admit that the ideal itself 
is not realizable). Conservative theorists seem immune to this critique, but 
they envision a return to the good or the creation of a social stability that 
they associate implicitly with the good.10 Political theorists of all stripes 
write to change the world and assist its progression (or its return to a bet-
ter state), whereas psychoanalysis interprets the world and uncovers the 
repetition at work where it seems to be progressing.
 For this reason, Julia Kristeva theorizes the political project inherent in 
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psychoanalysis as one of permanent revolt. Rather than forming a positive 
program, psychoanalysis, like modernist literature, exists simply as a nega-
tion of identity and power. In Th e Sense and Non-sense of Revolt, she argues, 
“psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and a certain literature, on the other, 
perhaps constitute possible instances of revolt culture.”11 From Kristeva’s 
point of view, psychoanalysis is completely political insofar as it demands 
revolt, but this revolt can never become revolution. Psychoanalytic revolt 
is destined to remain revolt against some existing power structure toward 
which it will continue to provide resistance. Kristeva views psychoanalytic 
thought as a hiccup in the hegemony of scientifi c rationality and progress. 
Any att empt to create a positive psychoanalytic politics would obviate its 
role as a key part of revolt culture.
 Kristeva’s dismissal of positive psychoanalytic politics fails to take cog-
nizance of the implicit positive program in every revolt. When one revolts, 
one relies on and sustains the system against which one revolts. Nowhere 
is this truer than within the capitalist system, in which revolt forms the 
lifeblood. If psychoanalysis is nothing but revolt, it is politically vacuous. 
And yet, Kristeva does correctly recognize the seemingly inherent hostility 
of psychoanalysis to progressive change. Rather than aid in this process, 
psychoanalysis highlights the moments of its interruption and suspension.
 Th is position puts psychoanalysis directly at odds with Marxism’s empha-
sis on the centrality of praxis. Marx theorizes in order to facilitate social 
change, and every political project by its very nature shares this goal with 
Marxism. What distinguishes both Marx and Freud as thinkers is their 
understanding of social antagonism. Where Freud sees antagonism mani-
festing itself in the excessive suff ering of the individual subject, Marx sees 
it playing out in class struggle. Despite this diff erence in focus, they share a 
belief in the fundamental status of antagonism, which separates them from 
political thinkers (such as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls) who view the 
social order as whole, as divided by confl icts but not by a fundamental 
antagonism. We can resolve confl icts through mediation and negotiation, 
but antagonism implies the impossibility of resolution.
 An antagonism doesn’t just involve two opposing positions — like that of 
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat — but conceives of opposition as internal 
to each position. Th is idea of each position being internally opposed to itself 
is what liberal political thinkers cannot grant (if they wish to remain liberal 
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political thinkers). Just as they view society as whole, they also view each 
confl icting position within society as unifi ed and identical with itself. Not 
so with Marx and Freud. For Marx, the confl ict between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat is at the same time the indication of an internal confl ict 
within the bourgeoisie itself. In fact, the bourgeoisie produces the proletariat 
out of itself through the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. 
For Freud, the confl ict between the individual and the social order is also 
an internal confl ict within the individual and within the social order.
 Even societies that lack the concept of an individual must nonethe-
less reckon with this universal antagonism. Th at is, they must att empt to 
reconcile the continued existence of the social order with the entrance 
of new subjects into that order. Th ough the individual may be a Western 
idea, the social antagonism resulting from the subject’s entrance into the 
social order is not. Th e elaborate marriage rules that Claude Lévi-Strauss 
uncovered in various societies att est to the problem of this antagonism 
surfacing universally.12 Th e individual emerges as a distinct being because 
the social order cannot reproduce itself without producing a remainder, 
even if this remainder doesn’t take the form of the individual that is familiar 
to the Western world.
 Th e idea of antagonism allows Marx and Freud to author their radical 
social critiques. It allows them to see how the proletariat or the individual 
invests itself in its own oppression, or how the bourgeoisie or the social 
order contributes to its own subversion. Antagonism is both the cause of 
social stasis and the possibility for revolutionary change. For Marx and 
Freud, interpretation must take antagonism as its point of departure, though 
Marx sees, in the last instance, the possibility of overcoming antagonism 
through the victory of the proletariat and the consequent elimination of 
class struggle.
 Marx envisioned a society in which production would take place for the 
good of the society rather than for the sake of the accumulation of capital, 
a change that would allow production to develop without limit. Within the 
capitalist mode of production, according to Marx,
the true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital 
and its self-valorization appear as the starting and fi nishing point as the 
motive and purpose of production; production is production only for 
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capital, and not the reverse, i.e. the means of production are not simply 
means for a steadily expanding patt ern of life for the society of the produc-
ers. . . . Th e means — the unrestricted development of the social forces 
of production — comes into persistent confl ict with the restricted end, 
the valorization of the existing capital. If the capitalist mode of produc-
tion is therefore a historical means for developing the material powers 
of production and for creating a corresponding world market, it is at the 
same time the constant contradiction between this historical task and 
the social relations of production corresponding to it.13
Included in this critique of the capitalist mode of production is the idea of a 
society in which the means and the end would no longer be in confl ict with 
each other. For Marx, “the unrestricted development of the social forces of 
production” — a society without antagonism — represents a genuine histori-
cal possibility. Th is is a possibility that Freud rejects because he conceives 
of antagonism as constitutive of the social structure itself.
Unprotected Sex
Before writing Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 1920, Freud did not yet see 
antagonism in this way. Th ough never a utopian believing that society might 
someday overcome the need for repression altogether, early in the develop-
ment of psychoanalysis he does argue against the excesses of contemporary 
moral restrictions on sexual activity. While he prefaces his statement by 
admitt ing that “it is certainly not a physician’s business to come forward with 
proposals for reform,” he nonetheless claims that “it seemed to me that I 
might support the urgency of such proposals if I were to amplify [Christian] 
Von Ehrenfel’s description of the injurious eff ects of our ‘civilized’ sexual 
morality by pointing to the important bearing of that morality upon the 
spread of modern nervous illness.”14 Freud made this claim in 1908, when 
his focus remained almost wholly on the sexual drives. At this time he saw 
a confl ict between these drives and the interests of the ego because “the 
‘ego’ feels threatened by the claims of the sexual instincts and fends them 
off  by repressions.”15 Th ough no one can defi nitively overcome this confl ict, 
Freud saw it as ameliorable, which allowed him to support a program for 
the reform of restrictions on sexual activity. We can lessen the bite that the 
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ego takes out of the sexual drives on a societal level and thereby improve 
the relative satisfaction of subjects living within society.
 When Freud discovered the death drive in 1920, this optimism became 
theoretically untenable and disappeared from Freud’s writings. While Freud’s 
discovery of the unconscious disrupted the thought of others, the discovery 
of the death drive disrupted his own and that of his followers — and this 
disruption makes itself felt in the halting and backtracking style of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle. Th ough he continues to posit sexual drives and thus 
retains his psychic dualism (albeit in a completely modifi ed form), Freud 
comes to see the death drive or the compulsion to repeat as the predominant 
force within the psyche and within society at large. He believes that it is 
more powerful than the sexual drives, just as before he saw the sexual drives 
as having more power than the drives associated with the ego. Despite this 
continued dualism, the discovery of the death drive radically alters Freud’s 
ability to accept the possibility of reform or progressive political change of 
any sort.
 When the sexual drives remained at the basis of Freudian thought, posi-
tive change existed as a possibility because dissatisfaction was not inher-
ent within the sexual drives themselves. Psychic illness such as neurosis 
developed through a confl ict between the sexual drives and other forces 
aligned with the ego (which also embodied the restrictive morality imposed 
on the subject by society). Even if we could not completely free the sexual 
drives from the repression associated with the ego, we could nonetheless 
lighten the burden and establish a degree of freedom. Seen in this way, we 
can imagine a Freudian politics of sexual liberation. Th is is the project of 
left ist psychoanalytic thinkers such as Ott o Gross, Wilhelm Reich, and 
Erich Fromm, each of whom att acks repressive society and focuses on 
sexual liberation.
 For these theorists, the early Freud before the discovery of the death 
drive is the more politically viable Freud. Gross, Reich, and Fromm develop 
disparate theoretical perspectives, but Reich and Fromm — Gross died in 
1920, though he undoubtedly would have adopted their opposition as well 
had he lived — see the concept of the death drive as an unfortunate devia-
tion on Freud’s part. Each tries to marry psychoanalysis with some form of 
Marxist or socialist thought, and by doing so, they take up Marx’s belief that 
society can overcome antagonism, that sexual liberation is possible within 
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the social order. Repression, for these psychoanalytic thinkers, is not the 
necessary cost of social life but a fact of what Reich calls authoritarian rule.
 Even before Freud comes up with the death drive, he insists that the 
sexual drive does not function smoothly but rather is constantly at odds 
with itself. His self-proclaimed dualistic conception of the drives — fi rst the 
sex drive and the self-preservative drive, then the life drive and the death 
drive — is actually a dialectical conception in which a single drive produces 
an antagonistic struggle. Th e psychoanalytic left ists do not see things this 
way. From their perspective, the sexual drive doesn’t run aground on its 
own but hits an opposing force — social restriction. As a result, the political 
project of psychoanalysis becomes perfectly clear: lift  social restrictions 
and allow the free play of the sexual drive.
 Wilhelm Reich gives this politics its most detailed early formulation. As 
both a committ ed Marxist and a psychoanalyst, he aligns the proletarian 
revolution with sexual liberation. Reich visited the Soviet Union in 1927 
and found the realization of this theoretical alignment, though he would 
later att est to the Soviet retreat from sexual liberation and return to the 
conservative ideology of the family. By freeing subjects from repressive 
restrictions on sexuality, the social order can allow the subject’s natural 
libido to fl ourish. Th e struggle, as Reich sees it, is entirely straightforward. 
An authoritarian rule imposes restrictions on natural sexuality, and these 
restrictions create the neurotic disorders that psychoanalysis treats. Reich 
contends that Freud fails to take up a critical position relative to social 
restrictions and thus blames the victims of society for the problems created 
by an oppressive authoritarian structure.16
 Erich Fromm takes a position similar to that of Reich, though he never 
associates himself directly with the Communist revolution. Unlike Reich, 
Fromm does accept a version of the death drive. He believes that a death 
drive can form, but he doesn’t grant it any independent status. Th e death 
drive, which is a drive to destroy oneself and others, emerges with the 
repression of the life drive. If life successfully expresses itself, the subject will 
not turn against itself and will instead develop loving relations with others 
and with the self. Despite this modifi cation of Reich, the psychoanalytic 
political project is basically the same for both Reich and Fromm. Psycho-
analysis takes the side of the natural libido or sexual drive and argues for its 
liberation. Rather than accepting the psychoanalytic critique of the good, 
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they see a sexually liberated society as a good society that psychoanalytic 
thought and therapy can help to produce.
 Th ough Gross, Reich, and Fromm develop the political dimension of 
psychoanalysis, they do so as practicing psychoanalysts. Th is investment in 
psychoanalytic treatment restricts the extent to which they are able to con-
struct a political theory. Th ey are psychoanalysts fi rst and political thinkers 
second. Th ey also collectively refuse to account for the later Freud’s turn 
to the death drive, even if only to see it as a necessary obstacle with which 
political struggle must contend.17 Herbert Marcuse suff ers from neither 
of these limitations. He is a philosopher and cultural theorist who comes 
to psychoanalysis to assist in thinking through political diffi  culties, and 
he recognizes that any political project has to incorporate the death drive. 
Marcuse announces his own unique marriage of Marx and Freud in Eros and 
Civilization, one of the two great att empts to construct a politics grounded 
on psychoanalysis. It is a book that bears the subtitle A Philosophical Inquiry 
into Freud.18
 Marcuse envisions a society that would eliminate scarcity to such an 
extent that it would no longer require the repression of our sexual drives, 
or eros. In this type of society, the need for labor would disappear, and 
the predominance of the reality principle (or the delaying of satisfaction) 
could give way to an unleashing of the pleasure principle (or the direct 
path to satisfaction). While Marcuse admits that up to this point in his-
tory progress has increased the amount of repression, he believes the end 
of labor — and the socialist revolution necessary to accomplish it — would 
occasion a dialectical reversal in which progress suddenly liberated eros 
rather than augmenting its repression. Th is vision allows us to imagine a 
world in which even death loses its traumatic dimension because individual 
subjects would be reconciled with the social whole that would survive them.
 In constructing his vision of a bett er future, Marcuse does not lose sight of 
the principle that opposes eros — the death drive, or what he calls thanatos. 
He views thanatos as an aggressive instinct, an instinct toward destruction 
that, unlike eros, demands repression in order for society to function.19 But 
there is a way to mitigate the power of this instinct for destruction: by elimi-
nating the repression of eros, a society lessens the aggression that subjects 
experience because much of this aggression arises in response to a lack of 
erotic satisfaction, though this aggression would not disappear altogether. 
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Marcuse’s ideal society appears to fi gure a way out of the antagonism that 
Freud sees animating the relation between the individual subject and the 
social order. He does so, despite borrowing terminology from the later 
Freud, by focusing on the liberation of the sexual drives in the way that the 
early Freud and the left ist Freudians advocate.
 But such a program is constitutively incapable of admitt ing the idea of the 
death drive with all of its theoretical force. Marcuse acknowledges the death 
drive in order to show how an ideal society might minimize its power, but 
the existence of the death drive sabotages the political program as such. It 
leads Freud to say, toward the end of Civilization and Its Discontents, “I have 
not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow 
to their reproach that I can off er them no consolation.”20 Th e death drive 
eliminates the possibility of off ering consolation in the form of a traditional 
political program because it erects a fundamental barrier to progress to 
an extent that Marcuse cannot fully recognize due to his Marxist political 
commitment.
Death at the Bott om of Everything
Th e death drive is neither (contra Marcuse) aggressiveness nor an impulse 
to return to an inorganic state (as Freud’s metaphor in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle might imply) but an impetus to return to an originary traumatic 
and constitutive loss. Th e death drive emerges with subjectivity itself as 
the subject enters into the social order and becomes a social and speaking 
being by sacrifi cing a part of itself. Th is sacrifi ce is an act of creation that 
produces an object that exists only insofar as it is lost. Th is loss of what the 
subject doesn’t have institutes the death drive, which produces enjoyment 
through the repetition of the initial loss.
 Subjects engage in acts of self-sacrifi ce and self-sabotage because the 
loss enacted reproduces the subject’s lost object and enables the subject to 
enjoy this object. Once it is obtained, the object ceases to be the object. As 
a result, the subject must continually repeat the sacrifi cial acts that produce 
the object, despite the damage that such acts do to the subject’s self-interest. 
From the perspective of the death drive, we turn to violence not in order to 
gain power but in order to produce loss, which is our only source of enjoy-
ment. Without the lost object, life becomes bereft  of any satisfaction. Th e 
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repetition of sacrifi ce, however, creates a life worth living, a life in which 
one can enjoy oneself through the lost object.
 Th e repetition involved with the death drive is not simply repetition of 
any particular experience. Th e repetition compulsion leads the subject to 
repeat specifi cally the experiences that have traumatized it and disturbed 
its stable functioning. Th e bett er things are going for the subject, the more 
likely that the death drive will derail the subject’s activity. According to the 
theory implied by the death drive, any movement toward the good — any 
progress — will tend to produce a reaction that will undermine it. Th is 
occurs both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. In 
psychoanalytic treatment, it takes the form of a negative therapeutic reac-
tion, an eff ort to sustain one’s disorder in the face of the imminence of the 
cure. We can also think of individuals who continue to choose romantic 
relationships that fail according to a precise patt ern. Politically, it means 
that progress triggers the very forms of oppression that it hopes to combat 
and thereby incessantly undermines itself. Th ere is a backlash writt en into 
every progressive program from the outset.
 Th e death drive creates an essentially masochistic structure within the 
psyche. It provides the organizing principle for the subject and orients the 
subject relative to its enjoyment, and this enjoyment remains always linked 
to trauma. Th is structure renders diffi  cult all att empts to prompt subjects 
to act in their own self-interest or for their own good. Th e death drive leads 
subjects to act contrary to their own interests, to sabotage the projects that 
would lead to their good.
 Common sense tells us that sadism is easier to understand than mas-
ochism, that the sadist’s lust for power over the object makes sense in a 
way that the masochist’s self-destruction does not. But for psychoanalysis, 
masochism functions as the paradigmatic form of subjectivity. Considering 
the structure of the death drive, masochism becomes easily explained, and 
sadism becomes a mystery. Masochism provides the subject the enjoyment 
of loss, while sadism seems to give this enjoyment to the other.
 Th is is exactly the claim of Jacques Lacan’s revolutionary interpretation 
of sadism in his famous article “Kant with Sade.” Th ough most readers focus 
on the essay’s philosophical coupling of Kantian morality with Sadean 
perversion, the more signifi cant step that Lacan takes here occurs in his 
explanation of sadism’s appeal. Traditionally, most people vilify sadists for 
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transforming their victims into objects for their own satisfaction, but Lacan 
contends that they actually turn themselves into objects for the other’s 
enjoyment. He notes: “Th e sadist discharges the pain of existence into the 
Other, but without seeing that he himself thereby turns into an ‘eternal 
object.’”21 Th ough the other suff ers pain, the other also becomes the sole 
fi gure of enjoyment. What the sadist enjoys in the sadistic act is the enjoy-
ment att ributed to the other, and the sadistic act att empts to bring about 
this enjoyment. In this sense, sadism is nothing but an inverted form of 
masochism, which remains the fundamental structure of subjectivity.22 
Self-destruction plays such a prominent role in human activities because 
the death drive is the drive that animates us as subjects.
 Unlike Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, another celebrated propo-
nent of psychoanalytically informed political thought, att empts to construct 
a psychoanalytic political project that focuses on the death drive. He does 
not simply see it as the unfortunate result of the repression of eros but as a 
powerful category on its own. In Life against Death Brown conceives of the 
death drive as a self-annihilating impulse that emerges out of the human 
incapacity to accept death and loss. As he puts it, “Th e death instinct is the 
core of the human neurosis. It begins with the human infant’s incapacity to 
accept separation from the mother, that separation which confers individual 
life on all living organisms and which in all living organisms at the same time 
leads to death.”23 For Brown, we pursue death and destruction, paradoxically, 
because we cannot accept death. If we possessed the ability to accept our own 
death, according to Brown’s view, we would avoid falling into the death drive 
and would thereby rid ourselves of human violence and destructiveness.
 Like Marcuse, Brown’s societal ideal involves the unleashing of the sexual 
drives and the minimizing or elimination of the death drive. He even raises 
the stakes, contending that unless we manage to realize this ideal, the human 
species, under the sway of the death drive, will die out like the dinosaurs. 
Despite making more allowances for the death drive (and for death itself) 
than Marcuse, Brown nonetheless cannot avoid a similar error: the belief 
that the death drive is a force that subjects can overcome. For Freud, in 
contrast, it is the force that revenges itself on every overcoming, the rep-
etition that no utopia can fully leave behind. An authentic recognition of 
the death drive and its primacy would demand that we rethink the idea of 
progress altogether.
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Progressing Backward
And yet some idea of progress seems essential to politics. Without progress 
as a possibility, it seems obvious that one would have no reason to involve 
oneself in political contestation. All political activity would become futile, 
which is why few dispense with it altogether. Even a thinker such as Jacques 
Derrida who struggles incessantly against the ideology of progress nonethe-
less implicitly retains some notion of authentic progress within his thought. 
Without it, he would have no position from which to criticize the idea while 
still endorsing political activity.
 Th e problem with progress as an idea, according to someone like Derrida, 
lies in the way that it places a teleology on the movement of history and 
thereby prescribes a certain future that will serve to constrain our political 
activity. Rather than helping to increase our freedom, the idea of progress 
diminishes it by closing down the opening that the future represents. Despite 
his deconstruction of progress, Derrida aligns deconstruction with hope for 
a bett er future — with what he calls an “emancipatory promise.” In Specters of 
Marx he elaborates: “Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, 
what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction 
is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps 
even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, 
even a messianic without messianism.”24 Th ough deconstruction leaves 
its emancipatory promise always to be fulfi lled and refuses to actualize it, 
Derrida tacitly conceives the movement toward it as progressive.
 Th e political dimension of deconstruction is founded on the belief that 
a bett er world is possible: by deconstructing hierarchies, by insisting on a 
justice to come, and by struggling against illusions of presence, we can lessen 
human suff ering and help to forge a more egalitarian world. Th ere is a good, 
even if fully realizing this good would transform it into its opposite (which 
is Derrida’s contention). One must ensure that the good society always 
remains to come, or arrivant, as Derrida puts it, but far from minimizing 
the status of the good or denigrating the good, giving it a futural status in 
fact elevates it and ensconces justice to come as the one idea that we cannot 
deconstruct — the ultimate or sovereign good.25 Even in deconstruction, 
some idea of progress as a possibility must exist in order for the theorist to 
make any normative appeal whatsoever.26
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 But the inescapability of the idea of progress goes still further. It is not 
just the normative appeal that implies this idea; any system of thought, even 
one that confi nes itself to pure descriptions, inevitably points toward the 
possibility of progress. Th e act of articulating a system of thought implies 
the belief that a bett er world is possible and that the knowledge the system 
provides will assist in realizing this bett er world. If I didn’t believe in the 
possibility of improvement, I would never bother to articulate any system 
at all. Th e very act of enunciating even the most pessimistic system att ests 
to a fundamental optimism and hope for progress beyond the status quo. 
Th is is true for an extreme pessimist like Arthur Schopenhauer as much as 
it is for an avowed utopian like Charles Fourier. Th e position from which 
one enunciates the pessimistic system is the position invested in the idea 
of progress, even when the enunciated content of the system completely 
denounces the idea. Th ough the good may be impossible to realize, it is 
also impossible to abandon entirely. Th e production of knowledge itself 
points, oft en despite itself, toward a bett er future.
 Th is link between knowledge and progress is the controlling idea of the 
Enlightenment. In his essay “What Is Enlightenment?” Kant emphasizes 
that Enlightenment requires a situation where one is free to gain knowledge, 
where one has “freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matt ers.”27 In 
the act of gaining knowledge through reasoning, subjects facilitate progress 
as they put this knowledge into use by restructuring society. Knowledge, 
for Kant and for all Enlightenment thinkers, has an inherently progressive 
leaning. It frees us from the tyranny of the past and from the drudgery of 
repetition. Progress is only possible because we have the ability to know the 
past and to learn from it.28 Th e Enlightenment’s belief in progress derives 
from its conception of the human subject as a subject of knowledge, a 
subject who fundamentally wants to know.
 For psychoanalysis, the link between knowledge and progress dooms the 
possibility of progress. Rather than desiring to know, the subject desires not 
to know and organizes its existence around the avoidance of knowledge. In 
“Le séminaire XXI” Lacan states this straightforwardly: “Th ere has been no 
desire for knowledge but . . . a horror of knowing.”29 Th e knowledge that we 
avoid is knowledge of the unconscious because this knowledge confronts 
us with the power of the death drive and the inescapability of repetition. 
What we don’t know — our particular form of stupidity — allows us to move 
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forward, to view the future with hopefulness. Without this fundamental 
refusal to know, the subject simply could not continue.30
 Freud’s great revolution in the history of thought stems from his concep-
tion of the subject as a subject of desire rather than as a subject of knowl-
edge. Where thinkers from Plato to Kant consider an inherent striving to 
know as essential to subjectivity, not only does Freud envision a diff erent 
essential drive, he contends that the subject wants not to know in order to 
continue to desire. Th e subject acts not on the basis of what it knows but 
on the basis of how it desires. We might imagine linking these two ideas of 
the subject if we could link the act of knowing and the act of desiring. 
 But knowledge and desire are at odds: the subject doesn’t want to know 
what it desires or how it enjoys. Its knowledge remains necessarily incomplete, 
and the gap within knowledge is the trigger for the subject’s desire and the 
point at which it enjoys. Th e unconscious emerges out of the subject’s inca-
pacity for knowing its own enjoyment. Conscious knowledge is not simply 
unable to arrive at the knowledge of enjoyment and its traumatic origin; 
it actively functions as a barrier to this knowledge. Conscious knowledge 
thwarts access to the unconscious, and, as a result, the conscious eff ort to 
know continually defeats itself.
 Psychoanalysis att empts to fi ll this fundamental lacuna in the project of 
knowledge by demanding that the subject abandon the project in its tradi-
tional manifestation. It constructs a space that brackets conscious knowledge 
in order that the subject might discover the unconscious. Th e fundamental 
rule of psychoanalysis — one must reveal not what one knows but the words 
that come to mind — aims at bringing to light what the subject doesn’t want 
to know. A gap exists between what the subject knows and what it says. In 
the act of speaking, the subject says more than it consciously knows, and 
this excess is the unconscious — a knowledge that the subject has without 
knowing it. Th e paradox of this knowledge is that one can access it only 
when not seeking it and that once one has it, one has lost it.
 Adherence to the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis insofar as it is pos-
sible allows subjects to recognize what they don’t know when it surprises 
them. But it doesn’t thereby permit subjects to make progress through 
the acquisition of knowledge. Th e recognitions that one makes in psycho-
analysis do not have the status of knowledge in the traditional sense of the 
term; instead, they mark an irreducible gap in the fi eld of knowledge. One 
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recognizes oneself in an unconscious desire that remains foreign, and one 
takes responsibility for it despite its foreignness. By doing so, one does not 
change or progress as a subject but becomes what one already was. One sees 
the death drive as the truth of one’s subjectivity rather than as an obstacle 
that one might try to progress beyond in order to reach the good.
Interminable Repetition
If we accept the contradictory conclusion that some idea of progress inheres 
in every system of thought and that the psychoanalytic concept of the 
death drive shows the impossibility of progress, this leaves psychoanalytic 
thought — and especially a psychoanalytic political project — on diffi  cult 
ground. It might explain the seemingly absolute pessimism of the later 
Freud, Freud aft er 1920, who appears to have abandoned his belief in the 
effi  caciousness of the psychoanalytic cure. One of his fi nal essays, “Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable,” writt en in 1937 (just two years before his 
death), lays bare Freud’s doubts concerning our ability to break from the 
power of repetition. Here, Freud conceives of subjects’ refusal to abandon 
castration anxiety and penis envy as emblematic of the intractability of 
repetition. He notes: “At no other point in one’s analytic work does one 
suff er more from an oppressive feeling that all one’s repeated eff orts have 
been in vain, and from a suspicion that one has been ‘preaching to the 
winds,’ than when one is trying to persuade a woman to abandon her wish 
for a penis on the ground of its being unrealizable or when one is seeking 
to convince a man that a passive att itude to men does not always signify 
castration and that it is indispensable in many relationships in life.”31 Th at 
is, the repetition that centers around traumatic loss acts as a barrier that 
we cannot progress beyond.
 In light of this barrier, the formulation of a psychoanalytically informed 
political project demands that we dissociate politics from progress as it 
is usually conceived. We cannot escape progress, and yet the traditional 
conception of progress always runs aground. Th is paradox must become 
the foundation of any authentic psychoanalytic politics. It demands that 
rather than trying to progress toward overcoming the barrier that separates 
us from the good society, we begin to view identifi cation with the barrier as 
the paradoxical aim of progress. Th e barrier to the good society — the social 
Buy the Book
20
Introduction
symptom — is at once the obstacle over which we continually stumble and 
the source of our enjoyment.32
 Th e typical politics of the good aims at a future not inhibited by a limit 
that constrains the present. Th is future can take the form of a truly repre-
sentative democracy, a socialist utopia, a society with a fair distribution 
of power and wealth, or even a fascist order that would expel those who 
embody the limit. But the good remains out of reach despite the various 
eff orts to reach it. Th e limit separating us from the good society is the very 
thing that constitutes the good society as such. Overcoming the limit shat-
ters the idea of the good in the act of achieving it. In place of this pursuit, a 
psychoanalytic politics insists on identifi cation with the limit rather than 
att empting to move beyond or eliminate it. If there is a conception of prog-
ress in this type of politics, it is progress toward the obstacle that bars us 
from the good rather than toward the good itself.
 Identifi cation with the limit involves an embrace of the repetition of the 
drive because it is the obstacle or limit that is the point to which the drive 
returns. No one can be the perfect subject of the drive because the drive is 
what undermines all perfection. But it is nonetheless possible to change one’s 
experience within it. Th e fundamental wager of psychoanalysis — a wager 
that renders the idea of a psychoanalytic political project thinkable — is that 
repetition undergoes a radical transformation when one adopts a diff erent 
att itude toward it. We may be condemned to repeat, but we aren’t condemned 
to repeat the same position relative to our repetition. By embracing repeti-
tion through identifi cation with the obstacle to progress rather than trying 
to achieve the good by overcoming this obstacle, the subject or the social 
order changes its very nature. Instead of being the burden that one seeks 
to escape, repetition becomes the essence of one’s being and the mode 
through which one att ains satisfaction.
 Conceiving politics in terms of the embrace of repetition rather than 
the construction of a good society takes the movement that derails tradi-
tional political projects and reverses its valence. Th is idea of politics lacks 
the hopefulness that Marxism, for instance, can provide for overcoming 
antagonism and loss. With it, we lose not just a utopian ideal but the idea 
of an alternative future altogether — the idea of a future no longer beset by 
intransigent limits — and this idea undoubtedly mobilizes much political 
energy.33 What we gain, however, is a political form that addresses the way 
Buy the Book
21
Introduction
that subjects structure their enjoyment. It is by abandoning the terrain of 
the good and adopting the death drive as its guiding principle that eman-
cipatory politics can pose a genuine alternative to the dominance of global 
capitalism rather than incidentally creating new avenues for its expansion 
and development. Th e death drive is the revolutionary contribution that 
psychoanalysis makes to political thought. But since it is a concept relatively 
foreign to political thought, I will turn to various examples from history, 
literature, and fi lm in order to concretize what Freud means by the death 
drive and illustrate just what a politics of the death drive might look like.
 Th e chapters that follow trace the implications of the death drive for 
thinking about the subject as a political entity and for conceiving the political 
structure of society. Part 1 focuses on the individual subject, beginning with 
an explanation of how the death drive shapes this subjectivity. Th e various 
chapters in part 1 trace the implications of the death drive for understand-
ing how the subject enjoys, how the drive relates to social class, how the 
drive impacts the subject as an ethical being, and how the subject becomes 
politicized. Th e discussion of the impact of the death drive on the individual 
subject serves as a foundation for articulating its impact on society, which 
part 2 of the book addresses, beginning with the impact of the death drive 
on the constitution of society. Part 2 then examines how the conception of 
the death drive helps in navigating a path through today’s major political 
problems: the ineffi  cacity of consciousness raising, the seductive power of 
fantasy, the growing danger of biological reductionism and fundamentalism, 
the lure of religious belief, and the failure of att empts to lift  repression. Th e 
two parts of the book do not att empt to sketch a political goal to be att ained 
for the subject or for society but instead to recognize the structures that 
already exist and silently inform both. Th e wager of what follows is that the 
revelation of the death drive and its reach into the subject and the social 
order can be the foundation for reconceiving freedom.
 Th e recognition of the death drive as foundational for subjectivity is 
what occurs with the psychoanalytic cure. Th rough this cure, the subject 
abandons the belief in the possibility of fi nding a solution to the problem 
of subjectivity. Th e loss for which one seeks restitution becomes a constitu-
tive loss — and becomes visible as the key to one’s enjoyment rather than a 
barrier to it. A political project derived from psychoanalytic thought would 
work to broaden this cure by bringing it outside the clinic and enacting 
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on society itself. Th e point is not, of course, that everyone would undergo 
psychoanalysis but that psychoanalytic theory would function as a political 
theory. Politically, the importance of psychoanalysis is theoretical rather 
than practical. Politically, it doesn’t matt er whether people undergo psycho-
analytic therapy or not. Th is theory would inaugurate political change by 
insisting not on the possibility of healing and thereby att aining the ultimate 
pleasure but on the indissoluble link between our enjoyment and loss. We 
become free to enjoy only when we have recognized the intractable nature 
of loss.
 Th ough psychoanalytic thought insists on our freedom to enjoy, it under-
stands freedom in a counterintuitive way. It is through the death drive that 
the subject att ains its freedom. Th e loss that founds this drive frees the 
subject from its dependence on its social environment, and the repetition 
of the initial loss sustains this freedom. By embracing the inescapability 
of traumatic loss, one embraces one’s freedom, and any political project 
genuinely concerned with freedom must orient itself around loss. Rather 
than looking to the possibility of overcoming loss, our political projects 
must work to remain faithful to it and enhance our contact with it. Only 
in this way does politics have the opportunity to carve out a space for the 
freedom to enjoy rather than restricting it under the banner of the good.
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